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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
While Kaitlynn ("Katie") Turner was staying at a house belonging to an acquaintance
who lived out of town, two Benewah County deputies entered the house without a warrant,
detained the occupants, and searched various parts of the house. Their initial search disclosed
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia hidden in a toilet. Although that particular contraband
was never connected to Ms. Turner in any way, after Ms. Turner saw other individuals
confronted with it and threatened with arrest, and after one of the officers implied that he would
be searching the rest of the house, including her bedroom, Ms. Turner disclosed some additional
contraband hidden in her room.
Ms. Turner filed a suppression challenging the officers' original entry into the house, the
search of the bathroom, and, finally, the search of her room; however, the district court denied
that motion. The court ruled that Ms. Turner lacked Fourth Amendment "standing" because she
exceeded the homeowner's permission by staying there overnight. Alternatively, it ruled that the
officers' actions in initially entering the house, and later searching Ms. Turner's bedroom, were
permissible under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The district court never
addressed the propriety of the search of the toilet, or whether the officers' actions in that regard
in any way tainted her consent to the search of her room.
On appeal, Ms. Turner contends that each of the district court's alternative rulings was
erroneous.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In April of 2018, John Simons was the absentee owner of a house in St. Maries, Idaho.
(Tr., p.8, L.12 - p.8, L.1, p.17, Ls.2-5.) He was planning to rent the house out but, at least as of
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early April, he had not yet done so. (See Ex. A, p.2.) 1 According to Mr. Simons, "there should
[have been] no one living there per se, just staying there from time to time." (Ex. A, p.2.)
"Darren Miller [was] supposed to be watching the place for [him], and [Mr. Simons] let this
Tiffany chick park a 5th wheel for a couple weeks there." (Ex. A, p.2.) Mr. Simons also gave
Kaitlynn ("Katie") Turner permission to be in his house, although the precise parameters of that
consent are disputed. (See Video 2 at 4: 15 - 4:26 (police officer stating that Mr. Simons told
him Ms. Turner could be at the house); Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.2 (same police officer
subsequently testifying that Mr. Simons said he gave Ms. Turner "permission to be at the
residence," but "[h]e did not wish that anybody was living there"); Tr., p.8, L.18 - p.9, L.1, p.9,
L.25 - p.10, L.2 (Ms. Turner testifying she had permission to stay at the residence, and had been
doing so for a week or two).)
However, having heard that there may be drug activity at his St. Maries home, on April 8,
2018, Mr. Simons sent a message through Facebook Messenger to a long-time friend, asking that
friend to check into the rumors. (See Tr., p.15, L.20 - p.18, L.4; Ex. A, p.1.) Specifically, he
asked his buddy to "get them for [him]," if there were people using drugs at his house. (Ex. A,
p.2; accord Ex. A, p.1 ("[G]et them!").) He went on to say, "It wouldn't hurt my feelings if one
of your coworkers went up there every other day and fucked with them." (Ex. A, p.3.)

1

A print-out of a Facebook Messenger conversation was admitted into evidence at the
suppression hearing as Defense Exhibit A. (Tr., p.5, Ls.17-24.) Exhibit A was originally
included in the record as part of an electronic (pdf) file, the filename of which begins with
"Exhibits V.1 .... " However, the version of Exhibit A contained in that file had a blank page
six. This blank page was an error, as the actual exhibit contains no blank pages (although there
is no additional content to the exhibit). Thus, Ms. Turner previously filed a motion to augment
the record with an accurate copy of the Exhibit A. That motion was granted on August 12, 2019.
In this brief, when Ms. Turner cites to the Facebook Messenger Conversation contained
in Exhibit A ("Ex. A"), she is referring to the corrected version augmented into the record on
August 12, 2019.
2

The long-time friend Mr. Simons was messaging was Mike Richardson, a detective with
the Benewah County Sheriffs Office. (Tr., p.13, Ls.7-12.) Detective Richardson had already
received a tip that there could be some drug activity at Mr. Simons' s house; he had already
observed the fifth-wheel trailer-which he believed was owned by Tiffany Reeves and was
involved in drug activity-parked by the house; and he had already asked other deputies to keep
an eye on the house. (Tr., p.14, L.1 - p.15, L.19.) Thus, after he exchanged messages with
Mr. Simons, he followed up with a phone call. (Tr., p.18, Ls.11-24.) Based on Mr. Simons's
statements in the messages, as well as during the phone call, Detective Richardson concluded
that Mr. Simons had given the deputies permission to enter his St. Maries house. (See Tr., p.17,
L.21 - p.19, L.16; Ex. A, pp.4-6.) However, there is no evidence in the record that Mr. Simons
ever consented to the police searching the house. (See generally Ex. A, pp.1-6; Tr., pp.5-69.)
Detective Richardson passed his information along to two other Benewah County
deputies-Deputy Wynn and Deputy Pulley. (Tr., p.19, Ls.3-16; see also Ex. A, p.4 ("I told my
Deputies they have full permission to check inside your trailer [sic] and the property until you
get it rented.").) A few days later, Deputy Pulley went by the residence at 1:30 a.m., and noticed
there were lights on and there were vehicles parked on the property. (Tr., p.44, Ls.6-15.) He
called Deputy Wynn, who met him on scene. (Tr., p.44, L.16.) Outside the residence, they
heard dogs barking and smelled cigarette smoke, but when they knocked for several minutes, no
one answered. (See Video 1 at 0:00 - 4:24.)2 When Deputy Wynn discovered a side door was
unlocked, they decided to go in. (Tr., p.26, Ls.17-19.)
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A DVD of Deputy Pulley's MUVI body cam of the encounter at the residence was admitted
into evidence at the motion hearing per stipulation as Defense Exhibit B. (Tr., p.5, Ls.19-24,
p.45, Ls.16-24.) The DVD contained four video files labeled, File0013 ("Video 1"), File0014
("Video 2"), File0015 ("Video 3"), and File0016 ("Video 4"). Video 1 is 29:27 minutes long
and depicts the initial approach to the house through the detention of the occupants; Video 2 is
3

Upon entering the house, they found Jakerson Pfeiffer and Tiffany Reeves m the
bathroom and ordered them into the living room. (Tr., p.27, Ls.4-14; Video 1 at 5:15.) When
Deputy Pulley told Ms. Reeves she was not supposed to be in the house, she responded, "Yes,
we are," and explained she knew Mr. Simons, and that Darren Miller and Katie Turner rented the
house from him. (Video 1 at 5:33 - 5:55.) Deputy Pulley disputed that claim, explaining that
Mr. Simons had told the police they could enter the home anytime, and that nobody was
supposed to be "staying there," but that "Darren is only supposed to be watching the house from
time to time." (Video 1 at 5:38 - 6:00.) When asked who else was in the residence, Ms. Reeves
indicated Ms. Turner was in a room at the other end of the house. (Video 1 at 6:06 - 6: 17.)
Deputy Pulley called dispatch, advising them they had two people detained, and asked
them to fmd out if Mr. Simons wanted them arrested for trespassing. (Video 1 at 6:30 - 6:42;
see also Video 1 at 7:07 - 7: 15 (making a second request that dispatch contact Mr. Simons).)

In the meantime, Deputy Wynn had gone to the other end of the house and located
Ms. Turner in a bedroom. (See Video 1 at 6:50 - 7:03.) She was dressed exactly as one would
be while sitting around her residence late at night-wearing only socks, leggings, and a tee shirt.
(See Video 1 at 6:57 - 7:03.) As Deputy Wynn detained Ms. Turner in handcuffs, she expressed

her outrage at the officers' intrusion into the residence. She repeatedly demanded of Deputy
Wynn, "Why are you in here?" (Video 1 at 6:52 - 6:57.) When she saw Deputy Pulley, she

29:55 minutes long and depicts the continuing detention and delay while waiting to contact
Mr. Simons; Video 3 is 13:46 minutes long and depicts the deputies in the house with
Ms. Turner alone while they conduct a more thorough search, arrest her and discuss her
"working" for them, and await someone to arrive and pick up the dogs inside the residence; and
Video 4 is 4: 19 minutes, and depicts Ms. Reeves in the patrol car after her arrest. Only Video 3
was provided as part of the original record. Thus, Ms. Turner included the DVD containing all
four video files in a prior motion to augment the record, which was granted on August 12, 2019.
When referencing the times of the videos, Ms. Turner refers to them in a minute/second format
as actually depicted on the file.
4

said, "Excuse me, what are you guys doing in here?" (Video 1 at 6:57 - 7:00.) When Deputy
Pulley said, "You're not supposed to be here," she retorted, "Yes we are! Stop it! Stop! Stop!
Please Stop!" (Video 1 at 7:00 - 7:07.)
Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer expressed confusion, stating that Mr. Simons had just been
there earlier that day, and implying that he had consented to them being there. (See Video 1 at
7:15 - 7:23.) Deputy Pulley asked why, if they had permission to be there, Mr. Simons would
have told the police no one had permission to be there. 3 (Video 1 at 7:23 - 7:26). While that
conversation was going on, Ms. Turner was protesting similarly to Deputy Wynn in the other
room. (See Video 1 at 7:15 - 7:34.)4
Ms. Turner then approached Deputy Pulley to tell him she had written permission to be in
the home, but she only got out, "We have a written," before he cut her off, stating, ''No. There's
no written-" (Video 1 at 7:34 - 7:37.)
Ms. Reeves, Mr. Pfeiffer, and Ms. Turner were then corralled in the living room, where
Deputy Pulley quickly read them their Miranda rights. (Video 1 at 7:37 - 8: 13.) After the
officers asked about drugs, but failed to elicit any incriminating statements (see Video 1 at 8:20 8:50), Deputy Pulley brought the conversation back to whether the occupants were authorized to
be in the home (Video 1 at 8:50). All three detainees said Mr. Simons had been at the house
earlier that day, and they detailed their interactions with him, making it clear that he had full
knowledge of their presence and apparently consented to it. (Video 1 at 8:50 - 9:38.) Deputy
3

Mr. Simons' s last communication with Detective Richardson had been days earlier-before he
visited the house and apparently gave Ms. Turner express permission to be there. (Compare
Tr., p.18, L.11 - p.19, L.2 (Det. Richardson testifying he exchanged messages with, and spoke
to, Mr. Simons around April 8-9, 2018), with Tr., p.25, L.13 - p.26, L.21 (Dep. Wynn testifying
he and Dep. Pulley entered the house on April 14, 2018).)
4
Because Video 1 is a recording from Deputy Pulley's body camera, Ms. Turner's full
conversation with Deputy Wynn in the other room is not audible. However, she can be heard
adamantly insisting that she had the right to be in the house.
5

Pulley then directed Deputy Wynn to call Mr. Simons. (Video 1 at 9:36 - 9:40.) It appears that
Deputy Wynn stepped outside to do just that. (See Video 1 at 9:38 - 17:25.)
Deputy Pulley and the three detainees continued discussing their right to be present in the
home. Ms. Reeves reiterated that Mr. Simons had just been at the house earlier that day; she
explained again that Mr. Miller and Ms. Turner rented the place; and she asked Ms. Turner how
long they had been there. (Video 1 at 9:40 - 9:54.) Ms. Turner responded, "Forever now, like a
couple of weeks at least .... " (Video 1 at 9:52 - 9:58.) Deputy Pulley, however, was unmoved
and continued to insist that his third-hand information was correct, stating, "He told us that
you're-nobody else is supposed to be allowed to be here." (Video 1 at 9:58 - 10:01.)
Mr. Pfeiffer then took up the argument, again explaining how Mr. Simons had just been
at the house earlier that day. (Video 1 at 10:20 - 11:02.) But once again, Deputy Pulley fell
back on what he believed Mr. Simons had told Detective Richardson days earlier. (Video 1 at
11:30- 11:50.)
Ms. Reeves then asked Deputy Pulley to call Mr. Simons. (Video 1 at 11:50 - 11:52.)
But after briefly discussing how to get a hold of Mr. Simons, the deputy again became
dismissive, stating, "I wouldn't come in here unless I had permission. . . . I don't just walk into
people's houses." (Video 1 at 11 :52 - 12:20.) Ms. Turner, quickly responded, "Neither do we."
(Video 1 at 12:20 - 12:21.)
Following a period of mostly silence, Ms. Turner and Ms. Reeves discussed whether
Ms. Reeves might still have messages on her phone from Mr. Simons concerning his consent for
her to be on his property, during which Ms. Reeves referenced having a key. (Video 1 at 13 :25 13:50.) Then Ms. Turner asked, "So if we're not supposed to be staying here, then how come we
have keys?" (Video 1 at 13:52 - 14:01.) Deputy Pulley indicated he did not know, stating, "He

6

told us-he told Detective Richardson that the only person that is supposed to be here or stop in
here is Darren Miller." (Video 1 at 13:57 - 14:06). Mr. Pfeiffer then expressed a concern that
Detective Richardson's information was stale, and he and Ms. Reeves again discussed the fact
that Mr. Simons had been at the house earlier that day. (See Video 1 at 14:07 - 14:24.)
A little less than eight minutes after he left to try to contact Mr. Simons, Deputy Wynn
re-entered the house 5 and announced that Mr. Simons's phone was apparently turned off;
however, he indicated he had just spoken to an unidentified friend of Mr. Simons, who
confirmed that Mr. Simons had been in St. Maries that day and who said Mr. Simons had given
instructions to keep everyone out of the house. (Video 1 at 17:20 - 17:36.) In the face of this
additional third-hand information, Ms. Turner and Ms. Reeves expressed their frustration, again
explaining that Mr. Simons had just been there a few hours ago and told them "it was fine."
(Video 1 at 17:36 - 18:09.)
When Mr. Pfeiffer brought the keys up again, Ms. Turner retrieved her key from her
belongings. (Video 1 at 18:16 - 18:31.) Deputy Wynn took the key and tried it on the door,
discovering that it worked. (Video 1 at 18:31 - 18:51; Tr., p.37, Ls.5-14.) As this was going on,
Ms. Turner told Deputy Wynn she obtained the key directly from Mr. Simons. (Video 1 at 18:31
- 18:36.) She also told the deputy that Mr. Miller had Mr. Simons's permission to stay in the
house. (Video 1 at 18:51 - 18:56.)
Deputy Wynn then asked whether Ms. Turner, Ms. Reeves, or Mr. Pfeiffer had a phone
number for Mr. Simons, and Ms. Reeves explained that Mr. Simons did not have his own phone;

5

When Deputy Wynn re-entered the house, Ms. Turner's and Ms. Reeves's dogs barked
protectively. (Video 1 at 17: 13 - 17:28.) They had done the same thing when the officers
originally knocked on the door (Video 1 at 0:48 - 1:03, 1:59 - 2:21, 2:32 - 3:00, 3:14 - 3:20,
3:37 - 4:00), and when they entered the house shortly thereafter (Video 1 at 4:32 - 4:55).
7

instead, he used his wife's phone or communicated through Facebook Messenger. 6 (Video 1 at
19:12 - 19:23.) She also explained that earlier in the day Mr. Simons had provided written
permission for them to be at the house, but he took the document with him when he left in order
to make copies of it. (Video 1 19:29 - 19:35.)
As Deputy Wynn made additional efforts to reach Mr. Simons through dispatch, Deputy
Pulley inexplicably began searching the house. (Video 1 at 21 :00 - 21 :30.) In the bathroom in
which Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfieffer had been found, the deputy rifled through everythingopening drawers and cabinets, and even lifting the toilet lid. (Video 1 at 21 :41 - 22:21.) Inside
the toilet, he apparently spied contraband. (See Video 1 at 22:18 - 22:21.) He then promptly left
the bathroom and, in a whisper, told Deputy Wynn there were drugs in the toilet. (Video 1 at
22:21 - 22:34; Tr., p.37, Ls.18-20.) Deputy Pulley then briefly continued his search of the
house, taking a cursory look inside Ms. Turner's bedroom. (Video 1 at 22:34 - 22:49.)
A couple minutes later, Deputy Pulley asked Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer, "So, straight
up, who pitched the dope in the toilet? The dope and the pipe?" (Video 1 at 24:25 - 24:30.)
When neither admitted ownership, he stated, "Well I'll just tell you straight up. If nobody takes
ownership, you are both getting charged for it." (Video 1 at 24:49 - 24:53.) Neither admitted
ownership. (See Video 1 at 24:53 - 24:57.) Deputy Pulley then asked Ms. Turner if he would
find narcotics in her bedroom: "Ms. Turner, you're not going to have any narcotics in there, are
you? In that room? Yes or no?" (Video 1 at 25:02 - 25:11.) She twice shook her head no.

6

Ms. Reeves' s statement was consistent with Mr. Simons' s mode of communicating with
Detective Richardson. He initially reached out to Detective Richardson via Facebook Messenger
(see Tr., p.15, L.20 - p.19, L.16) and eventually asked the detective to call him on his wife's
phone (Ex. A, p.3).
In addition, Deputy Wynn later indicated that when he referenced having tried to call
Mr. Simons, what he meant was that dispatch had been calling Mr. Simons's wife's phone.
(Video 1 at 20: 17 - 20:25.)
8

(Video 1 at 25:07 - 25:11.) Deputy Pulley then asked all three of them, "Is there gonna be any
other narcotics here in the house besides what's in the toilet?" (Video 1 at 25:16 - 25:20.)
Hearing only denials, Deputy Pulley then lectured them on the importance of honesty. (Video 1
at 25:28 - 25:53.)
By this time, dispatch had apparently contacted Mr. Simons. (Video 1 at 24:56 - 24:58.)
A few minutes later, Deputy Wynn reached Mr. Simons by phone. (See Video 1 at 27:25.)
Unfortunately, there is no good recording of that call, as Deputy Pulley's body microphone only
captured a small portion of Deputy Wynn's side of the conversation. However, after the call,
Deputy Wynn announced, "So Katie and Darren have permission to be in the house, um, nobody
else. He said he made it very clear to you [Ms. Reeves] that he does not want you using the
electricity from the house." 7 (Video 2 at 4:15 - 4:26.) Deputy Pulley then stated, "so, you two
[directed at Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer] are going to jail, and so is Jerry." 8 (Video 2 at 4:27 4:31.) Deputy Pulley took the handcuffs off Ms. Turner (Video 2 at 4:35 - 4:47) because, he
said, Deputy Wynn told him that "Mr. Simons allowed Ms. Turner to be residing in the
residence." (Tr., p.49, Ls.12-13.)
While Deputy Pulley took off Ms. Turner's handcuffs, she asked him in a whisper
whether she could talk to him privately. (Video 2 at 4:39 - 4:57; Tr., p.50, Ls.1-10.) Deputy
Pulley interpreted Ms. Turner's request to talk, coupled with her subsequent actions, as a request
to work for the police as a confidential informant. (Tr., p.52, Ls.4-10.)
7

Deputy Wynn later testified that Mr. Simons "indicated to me that he had given permission to
Ms. Turner and to . . . [Darren Miller]-that they had permission to be at the residence. He
wanted them to check on things. He did not wish that anybody was living there though."
(Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32, L.2.)
8
While Deputy Pulley and his three detainees waited for Deputy Wynn to get off the phone with
Mr. Simons, another man, Jerry White, had arrived at the front door of the house. Deputy Pulley
let Mr. White inside, and then arrested him for "trespassing." (Video 1 at 28:05 - 29:27; Video 2
at 0:00 - 0:23.)
9

A mere second or two after Ms. Turner made her hushed request to speak with Deputy
Pulley, Deputy Wynn asked whether Ms. Turner had any illegal drugs in her bedroom. (See
Video 2 at 4:56 - 5:00; Tr., p.56, L.20 - p.57, L.5.) Deputy Pulley responded by saying he was
"gonna take a look real quick." (Video 2 at 5:00 - 5:02.)
Deputy Pulley then walked into the bedroom with Ms. Turner. (Video 2 at 5:02 - 5:10.)
In whisper, he asked if she had "anything" in the bedroom. (Video 2 at 5:20 - 5:23.) Ms. Turner
admitted she had used syringes, and she opened a drawer to show them to the deputy. (Video 2
at 5:20 - 5:40; Tr., p.51, Ls.4-21) However, she had forgotten that one of the syringes was still
loaded. (Video 2 at 5:44 - 5:46; see also Video 2 at 25:30 - 25:43.)
Leaving the contraband where it was, Deputy Pulley and Ms. Turner went back into the
living room. (Video 2 at 6:07 - 6:18.) Deputy Pulley announced he was arresting Jerry White
for trespassing, and Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer for possession of the drugs and drug
paraphernalia found in the toilet. (Video 2 at 6:18 - 6:25, 6:50 - 7:35.) After Mr. White was
removed from the house, and after searching Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer, Deputy Pulley asked
whether there were additional drugs in the house "because we're gonna dig through everything."
(Video 2 at 10:27 - 10:55.) Deputy Pulley then rifled through the belongings strewn about the
living room, looking for additional drugs. (Video 2 at 11:55 - 15:00.) Meanwhile, Deputy
Wynn searched portions of the kitchen, opening at least one drawer and one cabinet (Video 2 at
13:38 - 13:45), before removing Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer from the premises (Video 2 at
14:10 - 14:35). Once Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer had been removed, Deputy Pulley resumed
his search of the living room, going through the couch cushions, opening a cigarette pack, and
sifting through the contents of Ms. Turner's purse (Video 2 at 15:03 - 16:20), before briefly reentering Ms. Turner's bedroom to scan that room again (Video 2 at 18:02 - 18:11). Moments
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later, he brought Ms. Turner into the bedroom again to more closely examine the drugs and drug
paraphernalia she had previously showed him. (Video 2 at 18:30 - 19:58.) He also took that
opportunity to go thoroughly search the rest of the bedroom-including through built-in drawers
and cabinets, and looking under her mattress. (Video 2 at 19:58 -21:30.)
Apparently, Deputy Pulley either had no intention of arresting Ms. Turner, or at least
wished to deceive her regarding whether she would be arrested, as she had remained
unhandcuffed even after leading him to the drugs and drug paraphernalia in her bedroom. (See
Video 2 at 4:39 - 23:57.) Additionally, he started telling her not to come back to Mr. Simons's
house, before quickly correcting himself and stating, "oh, wait, you're, you're okay to be here.
That's what he said." (Video 2 at 18: 17 - 18:23.)9
However, after Deputy Wynn returned to the residence, Deputy Pulley asked him to go
into Ms. Turner's bedroom and "look through that stuff' that Ms. Turner had shown him.
(Video 2 at 23:21 - 23:30.) After Deputy Wynn inspected the contraband himself, he returned to
the living room and immediately placed Ms. Turner under arrest. (Video 2 at 23:57 - 24:50.) As
he did so, Ms. Turner reacted with surprise and dismay. (See Video 2 at 23:59 - 25:02.) She
pleaded with the deputies not to arrest her: "No. Please. Come on. I said I would. Please. I'll
work with you. No, please don't take me out. Please don't take me out." (Video 2 at 23:59 24:10.) Deputy Pulley confirmed, "We are going to work," and both deputies explained she had
to be arrested and charged, as that was what the local prosecutor demanded. (Video 2 at 24: 10 24:55.) Ms. Turner then accused Deputy Pulley of having deceived her. After Deputy Pulley
told her his "hands [were] tied," she said, ''No," then motioned toward the bedroom and said,

9

Later, after Ms. Turner was actually arrested, Deputy Pulley explained to her, "I'm not
arresting you. Deputy Wynn is arresting you, okay?" (Video 2 at 26:40 - 26:44.)
11

"You could have told me . . . . Whatever happened to, 'be honest with me?' And I was being
honest with you, and you just screwed me over." (Video 2 at 24:50 - 25:02.)
Ms. Turner was eventually removed from the residence. (Video 3 at 10:00 - 12:52.) She
was ultimately charged with felony possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine).
(R., p.8.) After waiving her preliminary hearing (see R., p.45) and being bound over to district
court (R., p.46; see also R., pp.48-49 (information)), Ms. Turner filed a motion to suppress
asserting her Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the deputies entered the residence,
searched the bathroom, and searched the bedroom-all without a warrant. (R., pp.59-63.) The
State filed no written objection to her motion. (See generally R.)
During the hearing on her suppression motion, Ms. Turner testified first in order to
establish her "standing" to contest the validity of the deputies' warrantless searches.

(See

Tr., p.6, L.1 -p.12, L.18.) Ms. Turner testified that Mr. Simons granted her permission to live at
his house, and that she had been staying there for a week or two by the time the deputies engaged
in their warrantless raid. (Tr., p.8, L.12 - p.9, L.1, p.9, L.16 - p.10, L.2.) She further testified
that the room in which she was found that night was her bedroom. (Tr., p.9, Ls.2-4.) At the
conclusion of her testimony, her attorney argued: "I believe we've established standing. It's a
warrantless search. I believe the burden shifts to the State at this time." (Tr., p.12, Ls.11-13.)
The State conceded: "Court [sic] is satisfied with the standing, your Honor." (Tr., p.12, Ls.1415.)
The State offered testimony from Detective Richardson (see Tr., p.13, L.1 - p.20, L.20),
Deputy Pulley (see Tr., p.41, L.4 - p.58, L.15), and Deputy Wynn (see Tr., p.21, L.7 - p.40,
L.21); in addition to Ms. Turner's initial testimony (see Tr., p.8, L.1 - p.12, L.10), the defense
offered two exhibits-a printout of a portion of the Facebook Messenger conversation between
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Mr. Simons and Detective Richardson (see Tr., p.5, Ls.17-25; Ex. A, pp.1-6), and a DVD
containing four video files from Deputy Pulley's body camera (see Tr., p.5, Ls.17-25, p.58, L.1 p.59, L.12; Video 1; Video 2; Video 3; Video 4). Mr. Simons did not testify. (See generally
Tr., pp.5-69.) At the end of the hearing, the district court took the matter under advisement.
(Tr., p.69, Ls.8-10.)
Later, the district court entered a written order denying Ms. Turner's suppression motion.
(R., pp.67-77.) Despite the fact that the State had actually conceded standing, the district court
incorrectly indicated that "[t]he State alleges that ... [Ms.] Turner lacks standing." (R., p.67.)
It then went on to analyze the standing issue and rule that Ms. Turner lacked standing to

challenge any portion of the search of the residence (R., pp.74-75). Specifically, the court found
that she lacked permission to stay overnight and, therefore, had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the premises. (R., pp.74-75.)
Alternatively, the district court ruled that all of the officers' actions were proper under the
consent exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp.75-77.) The court ruled that Mr. Simons
had actual authority to consent to the officers' entry into his St. Maries house, and that he did, in
fact, give such consent. (R., p.76.) It further found that Ms. Turner consented to the search of
her bedroom by ushering Deputy Pulley into the room and disclosing the presence of drugs and
drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.76-77.)
After the district court denied of her suppression motion, Ms. Turner entered into a
conditional plea agreement, specifically preserving her right to challenge the denial of her
suppression motion. (R., p.86; Tr., p.71, L.16 - p.72, L.8.) Under the terms of the agreement,
Ms. Turner agreed to plead guilty to the charged offense and, in exchange, the State agreed to
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recommend a suspended three-year sentence (18 months fixed, plus 18 months indeterminate),
and probation. (Tr., p.71, Ls.19-25.)
Per the terms of the plea agreement, Ms. Turner did, in fact, plead guilty to possession of
methamphetamine. (Tr., p.75, Ls.7-10.) The district court accepted her plea (Tr., p.75, Ls.1719) and, later, it imposed a suspended sentence of three years, with eighteen months fixed, and
placed her on probation for two years. (R., pp.92-95; Tr., p.81, L.24 - p.82, L.18.) 10
Ms. Turner filed a notice of appeal timely from the district court's judgment of
conviction. (See R., pp.101-03.) On appeal, she challenges the district court's denial of her
suppression motion.

10

Ms. Turner's probation was subsequently revoked and the district court executed her
underlying sentence, although it retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.124-25.) Undersigned counsel is
informed and believes that Ms. Turner has since successfully completed her "rider," and she has
been returned to probation.
14

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Ms. Turner's suppression motion?

15

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Turner's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court found no violation of Ms. Turner's Fourth Amendment rights in the

officers' warrantless entry into, and search of, the house in which Ms. Turner was staying. The
court reasoned that Ms. Turner lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in that house (because
she did not have Mr. Simon's permission to stay overnight), such that she had no right to claim
the protections of the Fourth Amendment. Alternatively, it reasoned that the officers' entry into
the house was permissible owing to the consent of Mr. Simons, and the evidence-gathering in
Ms. Turner's bedroom was permissible because of her voluntary consent. The district court
erred in both of its rulings.
First, the State conceded that Ms. Turner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
house. That concession is dispositive. But even were it not, the district court's analysis of the
standing issue was legally flawed. Ms. Turner legitimately exercised authority and control over
the house (even if she exceeded Mr. Simons's permission by staying overnight), and as a result,
she had a legitimate expectation of privacy while she was there.
Second, although Ms. Turner concedes the officers' initial entry into the home was
permissible under Mr. Simons' apparent authority to consent, the consent exception to the
warrant requirement did not justify the search of her bedroom because the consent she gave was
tainted by the officers' prior unlawful search of the bathroom, the fruits of which were leveraged
to obtain her consent.
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B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court's findings of fact, so
long as they are supported by substantial evidence, but it freely reviews the trial court's
application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206,
207 (2009).

C.

Ms. Turner Had "Standing" To Challenge The Unlawful Search Of Her Bedroom
The United States Supreme Court has held that the "capacity to claim protection of the

Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place." Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978). 11 This capacity to claim the
protection of the Fourth Amendment is colloquially described as "standing." 12
In this case, the district court's order denying Ms. Turner's suppression motion claimed,
"The State alleges that a warrant was not needed because Turner lacks standing to raise the
issue." (R., p.67.) It then went on to rule that Ms. Turner did, in fact, lack standing. (R., pp.74-

11

The Supreme Court has since clarified that the capacity to claim protection of the Fourth
Amendment can be based on either a property right or a legitimate expectation of privacy in the
invaded place. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 11 (2013) ("The Katz reasonableexpectations test 'has been added to, not substituted for,' the traditional property-based
understanding of the Fourth Amendment .... "). However, because Ms. Turner does not claim a
property right in the invaded place at issue in this case, only the "legitimate expectation of
privacy" rubric is relevant here.
12
The term "standing" is not technically correct in this context. The United States Supreme
Court has rejected the concept of "standing" insofar as it implicates only procedural rules: "[I]n
determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his ... Fourth Amendment
rights, the 'definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive
Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing."' Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88
(1998) (quoting Rakas, 439 U.S. at 139-40); accord State v. Mann, 162 Idaho 36, 39 n.1 (2017).
Nevertheless, since courts continue to use the term "standing" imprecisely, that term is used by
Ms. Turner as a shorthand way of describing the relevant inquiry in this case.
17

75.)

It found as a factual matter that Ms. Turner did not have perm1ss1on to reside at

Mr. Simons's house, or to stay overnight, only that she was "someone who was permitted to be
at the premises."

(R., p.74.)

"As such," the court ruled, "she does not have a reasonable

expectation of privacy ... and her motion to suppress is denied on this basis." (R., p.75.)
The district court was incorrect. First, contrary to the district court's claim, the State did

not argue that Ms. Turner lacked standing; in fact, it conceded that she had standing. Second,
even if standing had not been conceded (or this Court were not bound by the State's concession),
the factual finding that Ms. Turner lacked permission to stay overnight did not ipso facto vitiate
her standing.

1.

Because The State Conceded Ms. Turner's Standing Below, The District Court
Erred In Even Addressing It

The State filed no written response to Ms. Turner's suppression motion. (See generally
R.) And, at the hearing on her motion, the State's sole argument was directed at the merits of the
motion, i.e., whether the searches at issue were justified by consent; at no point did the State
actually argue that Ms. Turner lacked standing. (See Tr., p.64, L.8 - p.69, L.4.) Accordingly,
the district clearly erred in stating that, "The State alleges that a warrant was not needed because
Turner lacks standing to raise the issue." (R., p.67.) 13
Not only did the State not argue standing, however, but it actually conceded it. At the
outset of the suppression hearing, defense counsel invited the prosecutor to begin, but the

13

Idaho's appellate courts "will only set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are clearly
erroneous. In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court determines
whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Evidence is substantial if
a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it." Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506
(2003). Because there is no evidence, much less "substantial, competent evidence," that the State
"allege[d] ... Turner lacks standing," the district court's assertion should be set aside.
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prosecutor indicated he would hold Ms. Turner to her burden of establishing standing, 14 so
defense counsel called Ms. Turner to the witness stand.

(See Tr., p.6, L.1 - p.8, L.5.)

Ms. Turner testified very briefly; she testified she had been living at Mr. Simons's house (with
his permission) for a week or two prior to the night in question, and that when Deputies Wynn
and Pulley arrived, she was in her bedroom.

(Tr., p.8, L.1 - p.12, L.10.)

Based on this

testimony, the following exchange occurred:
MR. HULL [Defense Counsel]: So, your Honor, I believe we've
established standing. It's a warrantless search. I believe the burden shifts to the
State at this time.
MR. THIE [Prosecutor]: Court [sic] is satisfied with the standing, your
Honor.

(Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15 (emphasis added).) Although the prosecutor misspoke and said "Court"
instead of"the State," it is readily apparent that he conceded Ms. Turner's standing. 15
The prosecutor's concession was dispositive. In State v. Hanson, the Idaho Court of
Appeals made it clear that standing may be proved by the defendant, or stipulated to by the State.
142 Idaho 711, 719 (Ct. App. 2006). A few months later, in State v. Cardenas, the Court of
Appeals clarified that no formal stipulation is required to alleviate the defendant of her burden of
proving standing; rather, so long as the State "tak[ es] a contrary position or otherwise
affirmatively waived" the standing issue, the defendant is relieved of her obligation to prove it.
143 Idaho 903, 908 (Ct. App. 2006). Therefore, once the State conceded standing in this case

14

The State was correct in asserting that Ms. Turner bore the burden of proving she had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in Mr. Simons's house. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S.
98, 104 ( 1980).
15
The prosecutor's concession of standing at the outset of the hearing is consistent with the
arguments he made at the conclusion of hearing. He admitted that, "at some point, they
[Deputies Wynn and Pulley] do in fact find out that she [Ms. Turner] is allowed to live there [in
Mr. Simons's house]." (Tr., p.67, Ls.8-9.) The prosecutor also conceded that Mr. Simons lacked
actual authority to consent to the search of his house because a landlord or owner cannot consent
when someone else lives in the home (although he argued that Mr. Simons had apparent
authority to consent to the search). (Tr., p.64, L.17 - p.66, L.14.)
19

(see Tr., p.12, Ls.11-15), Ms. Turner was relieved of her burden of proof See Cardenas, 143

Idaho at 908; Hanson, 142 Idaho at 719; see also, e.g., Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 457 n.1
(2011) (relying on Kentucky's concession in state court that the defendant had standing to
challenge the search at issue).
This precedent makes sense. As the Idaho Supreme Court recently made clear-albeit in
a different context-when the State makes a concession, it will be held to that concession. In
State v. Co hagen, the Court refused to consider the State's appellate argument on an issue that it

had conceded below. 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017). There, the Court explained as follows:
In its briefing before the district court, the State stated that it "concedes
that [Cohagan] was unjustifiably seized at the point Officer Curtis chose to retain
his license and hold it while running [Cohagan's] information for active
warrants." To allow the State to change positions on appeal and argue that the
stop was not illegal would sharply cut against our longstanding and recently reaffirmed policy of requiring parties to present their arguments to the court
below ....
Id.; see also State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, _, 445 P.3d 147, 151 (2019) (refusing to consider

the State's proffered independent source doctrine argument on appeal where, although the
prosecutor below cited an independent source doctrine case, he explicitly indicated he was not
relying on that case in furtherance of an independent source doctrine argument).
There is a very good reason to hold the State to its concessions: both the trial court the
and the defendant typically (and reasonably) rely on them. In State v. Sterling, for example, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that a rule precluding a defendant from raising on appeal a defense
never propounded below "is for the protection of inferior courts," as "[i]t is manifestly unfair for
a party to go into court and slumber, as it were, on his defense, take no exception to the ruling,
present no point for the attention of the court, and seek to present his defense, that was never
mooted before, to the judgment of the appellate court." 1 Idaho 128, 131 (1867) (emphasis
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added). Likewise, the "defense cannot be expected to respond to legal theories that the State
expressly rejected .... " Wolfe, 445 P.3d at 151.
In the context of Fourth Amendment standing, these concerns are particularly acute.
Once the State concedes standing at (or before) a suppression hearing, see Hanson, 142 Idaho at
719, the defendant is induced to forgo the presentation of whatever additional evidence she may
have tending to establish her legitimate expectation of privacy in the place invaded.

Any

subsequent evaluation of the evidence bearing on standing then would necessarily be rendered
unreliable, as it would be unknown whether the evidence was incomplete owing to the
defendant's detrimental-albeit wholly reasonable-reliance on the State's concession.
In this case, for example, there is no way of knowing what additional evidence
Ms. Turner may have proffered had the State not conceded standing after Ms. Turner's brief
testimony.

She might have presented additional testimony concerning her presence in

Mr. Simons's house and the scope of her license to be there; she might have produced notes, text
messages, or e-mail conversations concerning the same (the existence of which she, Ms. Reeves,
and Mr. Pfeiffer discussed with Deputies Wynn and Pulley during on the night in question (see
Video 1 at 10:49 - 19:44)); or she might have called Mr. Simons to the witness stand to testify
about her right to be in the house.
It was manifestly unfair and contrary to law for the district court to have made a ruling on

standing after the State had conceded that issue and Ms. Turner had relied on that concession in
good faith by declining to present additional evidence on the standing issue.

2.

Because She Was Living At Mr. Simons's House, Ms. Turner Had A Legitimate
Expectation Of Privacy In The House

Even if it were proper for the district court to have reached the standing question in light
of the State's concession, the district court erred nonetheless. Although the district court ruled
21

that Ms. Turner lacked standing to challenge the search of the house in which she was staying,
the court's reasoning was faulty; in fact, the record in this case clearly establishes that
Ms. Turner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the house.
The district court began its analysis of the standing question by pointing out that
"Ms. Turner claims that she was living in the home at the time of the search with permission of
Mr. Simons, and that she has standing .... " (R., p.74.) In the next sentence, it concluded that
Ms. Turner was not, in the court's view, credible. (R., p.74.) It then went on to analyze the
evidence, find as a factual matter that "Ms. Turner did not have permission to reside at the house,
or to store things at the house, and did not have permission to stay overnight at the house."
(R., p. 74.) Finally, it ruled that because Ms. Turner "was not a valid tenant" and did not "qualify
as an overnight guest," but rather, was "simply someone who was permitted to be at the
premises," she did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house. (R., pp.74-75.)
There are two flaws in the district court's analysis. First, to the extent that the district
court made a factual fmding that Ms. Turner was not living at Mr. Simons' s house, any such
finding was clearly erroneous. It is simply indisputable that she was living there (even if her
living there exceeded the scope of any permission granted by Mr. Simons). Second, as a legal
matter, the district court was incorrect to rule that her exceeding the scope of Mr. Simons's
permission automatically thwarted any legitimate expectation of privacy.

a.

To The Extent That The District Court Found That Ms. Turner Was Not
Living At Mr. Simons's House, It Clearly Erred

There is some ambiguity in the district court's order denying Ms. Turner's suppression
motion, as it is not clear whether the district found that Ms. Turner lacked permission to live at
Mr. Simons's house, or whether it also found that she was not living there at all. In context, it
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appears that the district court found only that she lacked permission to live at the house 16;
however, to the extent that it also found she did not live there at all, Ms. Turner submits any such
finding was clearly erroneous.
Idaho's appellate courts "will only set aside a trial court's findings of fact if they are
clearly erroneous.

In deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court

determines whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. Evidence is
substantial if a reasonable trier of fact would accept it and rely on it." Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho
503, 506 (2003). Applying this standard, any finding that Ms. Turner was not actually living at
Mr. Simons's house on the night in question was clearly erroneous. There was overwhelming
evidence that Ms. Turner was, in fact, living at the house, and there was no evidence whatsoever
suggesting otherwise.
When Deputies Wynn and Pulley arrived at the residence at 1:30 a.m. on the night in
question, they found Ms. Turner in a bedroom.

(Tr., p.29, Ls.2-16.)

She was dressed

comfortably and casually in a tee shirt, leggings, and socks (see, e.g., Video 1 at 6:57 - 7:03)exactly the attire one would expect a of a young woman sitting around her residence late at night.
Not only did she have her dog (as well as Ms. Reeves's dogs) there with her, but the dogs
behaved protectively, as if they had already established the house as "their" territory. (See Video
16

As noted, the district court's analysis of the standing question began by pointing out that
"Ms. Turner claims that she was living in the home at the time of the search with permission of
Mr. Simons, and that she has standing," and in the next sentence it concluded that Ms. Turner
was not credible. (R., p.74.) From these two sentences, it is not entirely clear whether the court
rejected both the proposition that Ms. Turner was living in Mr. Simons's house, as well as the
proposition that she had permission to do so, or just the latter proposition. Since the district
court then went on to analyze the standing question solely in terms of whether Ms. Turner had
permission to live at Mr. Simons's house (R., pp.74-75), and because the district court
acknowledged that one of the bedrooms in Mr. Simons's house was "occupied by the defendant"
(R., p.76), it appears the court's rejection of Ms. Turner's testimony was limited to her claim of
permission, and that it did not explicitly reject as untrue her claim that she lived in the house.
(See R., pp.74-75.)
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1 at 0:48 - 1:03, 1:59 - 2:21, 2:32 - 3:00, 3:14 - 3:20, 3:37 - 4:00, 4:32 - 4:55, 17:13 - 17:28.)
When the officers entered the residence, Ms. Turner greeted them with disbelief and repeatedly
challenged them on why they were there. (Video 1 at 6:52 - 7:07.) Ms. Turner told the officers
that she was staying at the house, and had been for a couple weeks (Video 1 at 9:52 - 9:58), 17
and her claim was corroborated by Ms. Reeves (see, e.g., Video 1 at 5:33 - 5:55). 18 She was also
able to produce a key the residence's front door. (Video 1 at 18:16 - 18:51.) Finally, it appears
Ms. Turner's belongings were in her bedroom. (See Video 2 at 5:33 - 6:02 (showing personal
items, including a hairbrush, on the nightstand from which she retrieved her drug paraphernalia),
18:38 - 20:20 (providing a slightly better view of the personal items on top of the nightstand, as
well as the contents of the drawers of the nightstand, which included feminine clothing and a hair
dryer), 20:28 - 20:35 (showing more feminine clothing inside a cabinet). 19 In light of all of this
evidence, coupled with a complete lack of evidence suggesting otherwise, to the extent that the
district court found Ms. Turner was not living at Mr. Simons's house, the court clearly erred.

17

At the suppression hearing, Ms. Turner testified consistently with her statement on the night in
question; she stated that she had been living at Mr. Simons's house for a week or two. (Tr., p.8,
Ls.18-24, p.9, L.25 p .10, L.2.)
18
Ms. Reeves informed the officers that Ms. Turner was living in the house even before they
contacted Ms. Turner. (See Video 1 at 5:33 - 7:03.) Notably, Ms. Turner was at the opposite
end of the house at the time (see Video 1 at 5:33 - 7:03) and likely out of earshot. Accordingly,
there was no opportunity for them to have coordinated a fabrication.
19
At the suppression hearing, Deputy Pulley referred to this room as "her bedroom," referring to
Ms. Turner. (Tr., p.50, Ls.19-20.) And as noted above (see note 16, supra), the district court
referred to this bedroom as "the room occupied by the defendant .... " (R., p.76.) It should be
noted though, that at one point Ms. Turner appeared to deny that she was staying in that
bedroom. (See Video 2 at 4:51 - 4:54.) However, that was moments before she showed Deputy
Pulley the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia that was hidden in that room, raising the
inference that this statement was falsely made in an attempt to deflect responsibility for the
contraband in that room.
24

b.

Even If Ms. Turner Exceeded The Scope Of Mr. Simons's Permission By
Staying Overnight, She Nevertheless Had A Legitimate Expectation Of
Privacy In The Premises

Regardless of any factual finding concerning the question of whether Ms. Turner was
actually staying at Mr. Simons's house, the district court's ultimate conclusion that she lacked

standing in that house turned exclusively on its finding that she lacked permission to stay there.
It ruled as follows:

The court finds that Ms. Turner did not have permission to reside at the house, or
to store things at the house, and did not have permission to stay overnight at the
house. She was not a valid tenant, nor does she qualify as an overnight guest.
She is simply someone who was permitted to be at the premises. As such, she
does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the house ... and her motion
to suppress is denied on this basis.
(R., pp.74-75 (emphasis added).) However, exceeding the scope of the homeowner's permission
is not dispositive of the standing question. The United States Supreme Court long ago rejected
the notion that standing turns on "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between
guests, licensees, invitees, and the like . . . . " Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978).
Accordingly, the district court's analysis is incorrect as a matter oflaw.
It is well-established that an individual may, in certain circumstances, have a legitimate

expectation of privacy in a home owned by another. See Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89
(1998). The classic example of this is a permitted overnight guest. Id. at 91 (citing Minnesota v.
Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 97-99 (1990)). In Olson, the Supreme Court identified a number of reasons

why a permitted overnight guest has an expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable. Olson, 495 U.S. at 97-99. One of those reasons is that both guest and host alike "are
at [their] most vulnerable when [they] are asleep .... " Id. at 99. Another is that "the guest will
have a measure of control over the premises." Id.
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Although Ms. Turner exceeded Mr. Simons's permission by staying overnight at his
house, the critical factors from Olson still exist here.

First, Ms. Turner, her dog, and her

possessions were still vulnerable while she slept. Second, she still legitimately had control over
the premises.

In fact, she had greater control over the premises than even the permitted

overnight guest discussed in Olson because Mr. Simons was not present. See Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (holding that where the defendant had use of a friend's apartment,

had a key to that apartment, kept a suit and shirt at there, and had slept there "maybe a night"
while the friend was out of town for about five days, he had standing to challenge the search of
that apartment), overruled, in part, on other grounds by Rakas, 439 U.S. 128. 20
In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court had occasion to grapple with the
question of what effect exceeding the permission of an owner has on one's legitimate expectation
of privacy. In Byrd v. United States, the Court addressed whether the unauthorized driver of a
rental car has a legitimate expectation of privacy in that car. _U.S._, 138 S. Ct. 1518 (2018).
In that case, the car was rented by a third party, and this third party was the only person
authorized to drive the car under the terms of the rental agreement.

138 S. Ct. at 1524.

However, immediately after renting the car, the third party turned the keys over to Mr. Byrd and
then left in a separate vehicle.

Id.

Mr. Byrd, while driving alone in the rental car, was

subsequently stopped by police and, ultimately, the car was searched. Id. at 1524-25.
In analyzing whether Mr. Byrd had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the rental car so
as to permit him to challenge the lawfulness of the search, the Court noted that there is no "single
20

Even though Rakas overruled Jones insofar Jones held that defendants have standing so long
as they are "legitimately on the premises" searched, Rakas, 439 U.S. at 141-48, the Rakas Court
held Jones was correctly decided under the "legitimate expectation of privacy" standard because
the defendant "had a key" to his friend's apartment and, "[e]xcept with respect to his friend, [he]
had complete dominion and control over the apartment and could exclude others from it."
Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 149.
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metric or exhaustive list of considerations" that controls the analysis. Id. at 1527. However, it
observed that the "' [l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside
the Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or to
understandings that recognized and permitted by society,'" and that the two concepts overlap
because "' one who owns or lawfully possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a
legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of the right to exclude.'" Id. (quoting Rakas v.

Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978)).
Utilizing this framework, the Supreme Court rejected the government's contention "that
drivers who are not listed on rental agreements always lack an expectation of privacy in the
automobile based on the rental company's lack of authorization alone." Id. at 1527. It pointed
out that a breach of the contracting parties' agreement-even a serious one-"has little to do
with whether one would have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the rental car if, for
example, he or she otherwise has lawful possession of and control over the car." Id. at 1529.
Ultimately, the Court held "that the mere fact that a driver in lawful possession or control of a
rental car is not listed on the rental agreement will not defeat his or her otherwise reasonable
expectation of privacy." Id. at 1532.
Like the driver in Byrd, Ms. Turner exceeded the permission granted to her by an owner.
But also like the driver in Byrd, this fact alone did not eliminate her ability to challenge an
unlawful search.

Because she still had legitimate dominion and control over Mr. Simons's

house, and was, in fact, staying the night there, she had standing to challenge the police actions
in this case.
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D.

The Officers' Searches Of Both The Bathroom, And Ms. Turner's Bedroom, Were
Impermissible Under The Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees "[t]he right of the

people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures .... " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "It is well settled under the Fourth and Fourteenth
Amendments that a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is 'per se
unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions."'

Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967)). One such "established and well-delineated exceptions" is where the "search is
conducted pursuant to consent." Id. However, it is the State's burden to show that the consent
exception-or any other recognized exception to the warrant requirement-is applicable in a
given case. State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, _, 445 P.3d 147, 150 (2019).
In this case, as an alternative to its ruling that Ms. Turner lacked standing to challenge
any Fourth Amendment violations, the district court also ruled that there were no Fourth
Amendment violations in light of the consent exception to the warrant requirement. (R., pp.7577.) Specifically, it found that both the officers' entry into the residence generally, and their
search of Ms. Turner's bedroom, were valid under the consent exception because Mr. Simons
granted consent for the police to enter his house and, once the police were inside, Ms. Turner
consented to the search of her bedroom. (R., pp.76-77.) What the district court utterly failed to
address, however, was the officers' warrantless search of the bathroom, and how that search
impacted the voluntariness of Ms. Turner's subsequent consent to search her bedroom. (See
R., pp.75-77.)
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On appeal, Ms. Turner does not challenge the district court's determination that the
officers' initial entry into the house was permissible pursuant to Mr. Simons's consent. 21
However, she argues that, once inside, the warrantless search the bathroom was unconstitutional.
Further, the improper search of the bathroom then tainted any subsequent consent by Ms. Turner
to the search of her bedroom.

1.

That W arrantless Search Of The Bathroom Was Improper

In the district court, Ms. Turner specifically challenged the search officers' warrantless
search of the bathroom as being impermissible under the Fourth Amendment (see R., pp.61, 62;
Tr., p.61, L.21 - p.62, L.9), and went on to argue that the fruits of that search included not only
the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia found in the toilet, but also the drugs and
paraphernalia later procured from Ms. Turner's room (R., pp.62-63; Tr., p.62, L.8 - p.63, L.9).
Nevertheless, both the State and the district court wholly ignored the legality of that search. The
State did not attempt to justify it-whether under the consent exception or on any other basis.

(See Tr., p.64, L.8 - p.69, L.4.)22 And in its order denying Ms. Turner's suppression motion, the
district court merely referenced in passing the methamphetamine found in the toilet (R., p.70); it
did not analyze the constitutionality of the search that led to the discovery of that
methamphetamine, or even acknowledge that Ms. Turner had challenged the search of the
bathroom.

(See R., pp.67-77.) Furthermore, although the district court found that Deputies

21

The district court found that Mr. Simons had actual authority to consent to the officers' entry
into his house. (R., p.76.) While that conclusion is somewhat dubious under the facts of this
case, especially in light of the fact that the State conceded below that Mr. Simons did not have
actual authority (see Tr., p.64, L.17 - p.65, L.12), because Ms. Turner concedes that Mr. Simons
at least had apparent authority to consent to the entry, she does not challenge the legality of the
initial entry.
22
In his closing argument at the suppression hearing, the prosecutor referenced the
methamphetamine found in the toilet, indicating that Ms. Turner "has not been charged with that.
We have not tied that to her at all." (Tr., p.67, Ls.2-4.)
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Wynn and Pulley had Mr. Simons's consent to enter his house (R., pp.69, 75, 76), it did not find
that they had his consent to search the house (see R., pp.67-77). 23
Since Deputies Wynn and Pulley did not have a warrant for the searches of Mr. Simons's
house, those searches were presumptively unreasonable. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 219. It
was incumbent upon the State, therefore, to show that a recognized exception to the warrant
requirement applied to the search of the bathroom. Wolfe, 445 P.3d at 150. However, the State
failed to proffer-let alone prove-any exception to the warrant requirement that could justify
the search of the bathroom. Accordingly, the district court erred in failing to find the search of
the bathroom unlawful and in failing to suppress the fruits of that unlawful search.

2.

Because The Unconstitutional Search Of The Bathroom Tainted Ms. Turner's
Subsequent "Consensual" Disclosure Of The Contraband In Bedroom (And Her
Statements About That Evidence), All The Evidence Should Have Been
Suppressed

It is well-established that when police violate a suspect's Fourth Amendment rights, such
a violation can taint the suspect's subsequent "consent" to search, such that the fruits of a later
allegedly-consensual search are required to be suppressed. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491, 507-08 (1983) (holding that suspect's consent was ineffective by reason of the fact that he
was being illegally detained when the consent was given)24; United States v. Oaxaca, 233 F.3d
1154, 1158 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that where a third party is aware of the government's illegal
entry into the defendant's garage and detention of the defendant, that third party's subsequent

23

Nor could the district have made such a finding. The evidence demonstrates only that
Mr. Simons asked the Benewah County Sheriffs Office to make sure Tiffany Reeves did not
plug her RV into his electrical outlets, and to check inside the house to ensure that no one other
than Darren Miller was there. (See Ex. A, pp.1-6; Tr., p.17, L.8 -p.18, L.21, p.19, Ls.7-16, p.25,
Ls.5-12, p.43, Ls.16-22.)
24
Although Royer is a plurality opinion generally, five justices agreed that the suspect was
illegally detained, and that this wrongful detention tainted his subsequent consent to search. See
Royer, 460 U.S. at 509 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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consent to a further search is tainted by the illegality); United States v. Thomas, 955 F.2d 207,
211 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that an illegal search of a hotel room, after which the occupants of
that room were confronted with police knowledge of the evidence found therein, tainted the
subsequent consent to search given by the two occupants); United States v. Abarza, 143 F. Supp.
3d 1082, 1095 (D. Ore. 2015) (finding that a prior unlawful search of the defendant's person,
during which no evidence was found, nonetheless tainted the defendant's subsequent consent to
search his car); United States v. Klopfenstine, 673 F. Supp. 356, 360-61 (W.D. Mo. 1987)
(finding defendant's consent to search to be tainted where it was given after being confronted
with evidence seized during a prior illegal entry into his apartment); State v. Hudson, 147 Idaho
335, 338 (Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the defendant's consent for police to search his motel
room was tainted by the officer's illegal entry into the room); State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112,
119 (Ct. App. 2007) ("Confronting a suspect with evidence found in an unlawful search may
constitute an exploitation of the prior illegality that taints the consent thereby induced."); State v.

Kerley, 134 Idaho 870, 874-75 (Ct. App. 2000) (holding that defendant's consent to search his
pockets was tainted by a preceding unlawful frisk).

Likewise, any incriminating statements

made after the illegal search may be tainted. See, e.g., Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 630-33
(2003) (holding that suspect's incriminating statements were required to be suppressed where
those statements were made following his wrongful arrest); State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 238-39
(Ct. App. 1994) (holding that incriminating statements made after being confronted with the
fruits of an illegal search are inadmissible).
Courts evaluating the taint attributable to a prior illegal search sometimes do so as part of
an exclusionary rule analysis-determining whether the defendant's subsequent consent, coupled
with the surrounding circumstances, sufficiently attenuated the illegality from the evidence at
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issue. See, e.g., Kerley, 134 Idaho 874-75. Other courts evaluate the taint under the consent
exception to the warrant requirement, determining whether the illegality affected the
voluntariness of the defendant's consent. See, e.g., Tietsort, 145 Idaho at 119. And still others
are wholly unclear as to doctrine employed, utilizing language that suggests a mash-up of
exclusionary rule and consent exception analyses.

See, e.g., Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08.

Regardless of the applicable framework though, the evidence obtained in Ms. Turner's room
should have been suppressed.

a.

The Evidence Obtained In Ms. Turner's Bedroom Should Have Been
Suppressed As "Fruit Of The Poisonous Tree"

"Evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment is subject to the exclusionary
rule, which requires unlawfully sized evidence to be excluded from trial." State v. Cohagan, 162
Idaho 717, 720 (2017) (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963)). This rule
requires suppression of both primary evidence (evidence obtained as a direct result of the illegal
search), and so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree" (later-discovered evidence that is nonetheless
derived from the illegal search). Id.
With regard to fruit of the poisonous tree, the defendant's only burden is to demonstrate a
"causal connection between the police misconduct and the evidence," at which point "the burden
of proof shift[ s] to the government to show that the unlawful conduct did not taint the evidence,
either by demonstrating discovery through independent means, inevitable discovery, or
attenuation from the illegality sufficient to dissipate its taint." State v, Cardenas, 143 Idaho 903,
909 (Ct. App. 2006). See also Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 487-88. Here, the basic causal connection
between the unlawful search of the bathroom and the evidence obtained from Ms. Turner's
bedroom is readily apparent.
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As Ms. Turner, Ms. Reeves, and Mr. Pfeiffer sat handcuffed in the living room, they were
able to see Deputy Pulley begin his warrantless, improper search of the house. (See Video at
21:00 - 21:30.) They would have seen him look around the kitchen as he walked through it, and
they would have known he was proceeding down a hallway toward the bathroom and the back of
the house. (See Video 1 at 21:30 - 21:40.) From their vantage points, they probably would not
have seen him enter the bathroom, and they certainly would not have seen him search through
the bathroom (see Video 1 at 21 :40 - 22:21 ), but they would have seen him come back through
the kitchen, whisper something to Deputy Wynn, and then look into Ms. Turner's bedroom (see
Video 1 at 22:21 - 22:50). Any doubts that had as to what Deputy Pulley had been doing were
quickly dispelled though, when he asked Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer, "So, straight up, who
pitched the dope in the toilet? The dope and the pipe?" (Video 1 at 24:25 - 24:30.) At that
point, all three detainees would have known that the deputies felt entitled to root and rummage at
will, regardless of anyone Constitutional rights. 25 They also would have had reason to believe
that Deputy Pulley was not going to limit himself to the toilet bowl. Moments after confronting
Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer with the contraband discovered in the toilet, he asked, "Ms. Turner,
you're not going to have any narcotics in there, are you? In that room? Yes or no?" (Video 1 at
25:02 - 25:11.) When she twice shook her head no (Video 1 at 25:07 - 25:11), he then asked all
three of them, "Is there gonna be any other narcotics here in the house besides what's in the
toilet?" (Video 1 at 25:16 - 25:20.) By choosing the words that he did-whether there were

25

Ms. Turner's perception that Deputies Wynn and Pulley were utterly lawless in their quest to
find contraband would only be reinforced moments later when she observed Deputy Pulley's
interactions with Jerry White. As noted above, when Mr. White arrived at the front door of the
house, Deputy Pulley let Mr. White inside and then arrested him for "trespassing." (Video 1 at
28:05 - 29:27; Video 2 at 0:00 - 0:23.) Of course, merely knocking on the front door of a
residence, when there is no reason to believe visitors are prohibited, is not a criminal trespass
under Idaho law. See I.C. § 18-7008(2).
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"going" to be drugs elsewhere in the house-Deputy Pulley suggested the inevitability of
additional searching by the officers and, therefore, the inevitability of their discovery of any
additional contraband. No doubt this was an intentional ploy calculated to prompt the detainees
to confess to the existence of any additional illegal drugs. At that point, Ms. Turner had every
reason to believe that the drug paraphernalia (and what she believed was mere residue) would be
discovered.
In addition, Deputy Pulley made it clear that any unanswered questions about who was
responsible for any contraband found would result in everyone being punished. Specifically, in
confronting Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer with the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia
found in the toilet, he said, "Well I'll just tell you straight up. If nobody takes ownership, you
are both getting charged for it." (Video 1 at 24:49 - 24:53; see also Video 2 at 4:27 - 4:31
(telling both Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer they "are going to jail").) This created for Ms. Turner
a strong incentive to do anything she could to try mitigate her personal consequences for the drug
paraphernalia and drug residue that she knew was in her bedroom.
Just ten minutes after observing Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer being confronted with the
contraband unlawfully discovered in the toilet (and being told they were going to jail for it), and
hearing Deputy Pulley suggest to everyone present that the entire house, including Ms. Turner's
bedroom, was going to be illegally searched, Ms. Turner apparently made the decision to
incriminate herself by disclosing to Deputy Pulley the drug residue and paraphernalia in her
bedroom, put herself at risk by becoming a confidential informant for the police, and in that way
attempt to curry favor with the officers. (See Video 1 at 24:25 - 29:36; Video 2 at 0:00 - 4:47.)
Under these circumstances, there can be no doubt that at least part of Ms. Turner's motivation in
cooperating with Deputy Pulley was her certainty that the contraband in her bedroom would be
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found-certainty created by her having been confronted by the fruits of Deputy Pulley's prior
illegal search of the bathroom. This is more than enough to meet the very low threshold for "but
for" causation.
Of course, the State was still free to have argued that the contraband illegally discovered
in the bathroom was so far removed from Ms. Turner's disclosures in her bedroom that the taint
of the illegal search was purged by time, space, or other circumstances. Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963); State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 721 (2017). Under the
attenuation doctrine, the State could have attempted to show that "the connection between [the]
unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence [was] remote or ha[d] been interrupted by some
intervening circumstance," such as Ms. Turner's consent, "so that 'the interest protected by the
constitutional guarantee that ha[d] been violated would not be served by suppression of the
evidence obtained"' in Ms. Turner's bedroom. Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721 (quoting Utah v.

Strieff, _ U.S. _, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016) (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,
593 (2006)) (alterations added)).

However, the burden of making an attenuation doctrine

argument, and establishing its application under the facts of this case, lay with the State. See

Cardenas, 143 Idaho at 710. And here, the State made no attempt to argue attenuation. In fact,
it never even acknowledged the illegal search of the bathroom, much less attempt to respond to
the defense's contention that the evidence disclosed in Ms. Turner's bedroom was tainted by the
prior unlawful search of the bathroom. 26 (See Tr., p.64, L.8 - p.69, L.4.) Accordingly, the State
waived that argument, as "[i]ssues not raised below will not be considered by this court on

26

In her suppression motion, Ms. Turner argued that, "While the drugs found in the bathroom
are not attributable to Ms. Turner, she is confronted with the fruits of this illegal search and her
further conduct is not purged of the taint of that illegal search. This search would require the
suppression of Ms. Turner's statements in the bedroom and the fruits of the search of the
bedroom." (R., p.62 (citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484).)
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appeal, and the parties will be held to the theory upon which the case was presented to the lower
court."

State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275 (2017) (quoted with approval in

Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 721).

Since Ms. Turner has met her minimal burden of showing simple causation, and because
the attenuation doctrine is not properly before this Court owing to the State's failure to raise it
below, all of the evidence obtained from Ms. Turner's bedroom was "fruit of the poisonous tree."
Accordingly, the district court's order denying Ms. Turner's suppression order should be
reversed, and her case should be remanded to the district court for entry of an order suppressing
all of the evidence obtained in her bedroom.

b.

The Evidence Obtained In Ms. Turner's Bedroom Was Not A Product Of
Voluntary Consent

Even if the evidence obtained in Ms. Turner's bedroom was not directly suppressible as
"fruit of the poisonous tree," i.e., fruit of the unlawful search of the bathroom, it was still
required to have been suppressed if Ms. Turner's consent to its disclosure was not voluntary.
That is because when the State seeks to utilize the consent exception to the warrant requirement,
it bears the burden of proving that defendant's "consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the
result of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 248
(1973).
The voluntariness of the defendant's consent to search is a question of fact, Schneckloth,
412 U.S. at 248-49, and in this case the district court found that Ms. Turner's consent was, in
fact, voluntary (R., pp.75, 76-77). Typically, such a finding would be subject to tremendous
deference from this Court. See Neider v. Shaw, 138 Idaho 503, 506 (2003) (discussing the "clear
error" standard of review). However, in this case, the district court's voluntariness finding did
not even consider the most important factor (and, indeed, the crux of Ms. Turner's argument):
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that Ms. Turner took Deputy Pulley into her bedroom, made somewhat incriminating statements,
and showed him the contraband, only after being confronted with the fruits of the prior illegal
search of the bathroom and being led to believe that a further illegal search of her bedroom was
inevitable. (See R., pp.76-77.) The district court's finding that Ms. Turner's consensual actions
were voluntary appears to be based solely on her words and actions at the moment, without any
consideration whatsoever of the critical circumstances leading up to those words and actionsthe unlawful search of the bathroom, Deputy Pulley confronting Ms. Reeves and Mr. Pfeiffer
with the fruits of that search and threatening to arrest both of them, or Deputy Pulley's
suggestion that the entire house would be unlawfully searched. (See R., pp.76-77.) Indeed, the
district court could not have taken into consideration the effect of the prior illegal search of the
bathroom because it neglected to even address Ms. Turner's challenge to that search.

(See

R., pp.67-77.)
In circumstances such as this-where the district court failed to even consider the prior
illegality and its effect on the voluntariness of subsequent consent-it is not appropriate to defer
to the court's voluntariness finding.

State v. Tietsort, 145 Idaho 112 (Ct. App. 2007), is

instructive. In that case, officers investigating a stolen car first unlawfully entered and searched
a barn; they then used a description of the evidence observed therein, along with a threat to get a
search warrant, to convince the defendant to consent to search all the barns and vehicles on the
property; and then, after having engaged in additional searches pursuant to the defendant's
consent, the officers used the fruits of those searches to obtain a warrant permitting a search of
the interior of the house, where additional contraband was found.
On these facts, the Court of Appeals observed that the validity of the defendant's consent
was the crux of the Fourth Amendment analysis since, if the consent was valid, the items
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discovered in the consent search were not only admissible in their own right, but also justified
the subsequent warrant that led to discovery of additional contraband in the house. Id. at 117.
Although the district court had found that the defendant's consent was voluntary "because he
approached the officers of his own volition, engaged them in conversation," and only granted
partial consent (withholding consent to search the house), and because "considerable time had
elapsed" between the original unlawful search of the barn and consent being given, id. at 119, the
Court of Appeals noted that the district court's finding of voluntariness did not take into
consideration the impact of the prior illegality, i.e., "whether the officers' assertions ... that they
had discovered stolen items and could obtain a search warrant constituted an exploitation of any
illegality in the prior search that tainted the consent and rendered it involuntary," id. at 118. The
Court noted that any exploitation of the illegality in threatening to get a warrant "would
undermine the voluntariness of Tietsort's consent .... " Id. at 119. Thus, while the Court of
Appeals recognized that it was obligated to "defer to a trial court's finding that consent was
voluntary if it is a reasonable inference that may be drawn from the record, . . . [t]he validity of
Tietsort's consent could not properly be determined without first determining the propriety of the
representations made to Tietsort by the officers," and that, in tum, depended on whether there
was any non-suppressible evidence to support their claim of authority to obtain a search warrant.

Id. Accordingly, the Court remanded the case in order for the district court to fully evaluate the
officers' lawful ability to obtain (and, thus, threaten to obtain) a warrant and then re-evaluate its
voluntariness analysis. Id. at 120.
This case, like Tietsort, requires a remand for the district court to both evaluate the
lawfulness of the officers' prior actions, and to make a voluntariness determination in light of
this critical factor. Without the validity of the bathroom search having been determined, and its

38

effect on Ms. Turner's consent having been considered, "the validity of [Ms. Turner's] consent
could not properly be determined" by the district court. Id. at 119. Absent that, the district
court's voluntariness finding is unreasonable, and should not be deferred to. See id.
In light of Tietsort, if this Court does not reverse the district court's order denying
Ms. Turner's motion to suppress based on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, it should at
least remand this case to the district court for a proper voluntariness determination that considers
the effects of the unlawful search of the bathroom and the other circumstances leading up to
Ms. Turner's consent being given.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons detailed above, Ms. Turner respectfully requests that this Court find that
she has Fourth Amendment "standing." Further, she asks that this Court vacate her judgment of
conviction and reverse the district court's order denying her motion to suppress based on the fruit
of the poisonous tree doctrine. Alternatively, she asks that the Court vacate the order denying
her suppression motion, and that it remand the case for a new, more robust analysis of the
voluntariness of her consent.
DATED this 22 nd day ofNovember, 2019.
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